The sustainability of the WTO dispute settlement system: does it work for developing countries? by Wood, Jacob & Wu, Jie
ResearchOnline@JCU  
This is the author-created version of the following work:
Wood, Jacob, and Wu, Jie (2020) The sustainability of the WTO dispute settlement
system: does it work for developing countries?. Journal of World Trade, 54 (4) pp.
531-566. 
 
Access to this file is available from:
https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/60328/
© 2020 Kluwer Law International
Please refer to the original source for the final version of this work: 
https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Journal+of+World+Trade/54.4/TRAD202
0024
     
The Sustainability of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Does it work 








Director of CITBA (Centre of International Trade and Business in Asia), Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Business, James Cook University Singapore, 149 Sims Road, Singapore. [Email]: jacob.wood@jcu.edu.au 
 
Jie Wu 
Corresponding Author: Associate Professor, Department of International Economics and Trade, College of 



























The Sustainability of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Does it work 






Our study provides an econometric analysis of whether developing countries are disadvantaged 
by the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Despite the many successes of the Dispute 
Settlement Board (DSB), there is a need to better understand the overall effectiveness of the 
dispute mechanism. Using bilateral data for about 160 countries from 1995 to 2017, this paper 
describes the influencing factors for developing countries' participation in the dispute 
settlement process. By conducting a rare events logistic regression analysis, the results from 
this study show that the key factors that determine the ability for a developing country to initiate 
a dispute against another country include the export intensity, retaliation capability, economic 
power, and economic threat from potential defendant countries. This means that not all 
developing countries can participate in trade dispute settlement mechanisms, so the WTO 
dispute settlement system has relative legitimacy. In addition, we further compare and analyze 
the influence of these four dimensions over different time periods and in different target 
countries through seemingly unrelated estimations. 
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Since coming into being in 1995, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) has played a key role in resolving disputes that emerge following the 
implementation of international trade agreements. The DSU was introduced as a means of 
overcoming a major problem of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which had no provisions by which it could settle trade disputes. The new system 
replaced the political process of the GATT system with a more rule-oriented system, applying 
public international law (Palmeter and Marvroidis, 2004). It is considered a significant 
improvement on its predecessor and the backbone of the multilateral trading system (Busch 
and Reinhardt, 2003). It was designed to provide a level playing field for all members, so that 
the poorer countries could safeguard their interests regardless of their economic power.1  
 
The DSU is an exclusive and mandatory system of dispute resolution. Any WTO member has 
the right to launch a formal complaint about the trade practices of any other member through a 
formal procedure that includes consultations, a panel decision, an appeal, adoption, and 
implementation. The process is mandatory from the perspective that once a complainant files 
a request for consultation, the case proceeds along a specified timeline to its conclusion, with 
the defendant being unable to either block the case or engage in activities that may lead to 
continual delays. In this regard, any report provided by the panel or the Appellate Body (AB) 
must be formally adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) shortly after its circulation. 
Moreover, the WTO stipulates a ruling provided in a panel report must be adopted no later than 
60 days after its circulation, and no later than 30 days after circulation in the case of appellate 
                                                          
1 As of July 2019, the overwhelming majority of the 164 member countries are classified as being developing 
countries and of these 36 are deemed by the United Nations (UN) to be least-developed. 
reports.2 In addition to its mandatory nature, the DSU is, by its own terms, exclusive. Article 
23 of the DSU states members must make use of the DSU to deal with the nullification and 
impairment of WTO obligations and shall not make determinations about the WTO-
consistency of another state’s conduct except through the DSU (Guzman and Simmons, 2005). 
 
Given the basic rules and procedures of dispute settlement under the WTO are the same for all 
member countries much has been said about its inability to effectively adjudicate on the trading 
interests of certain types of members, such as small or developing countries. Some argue that 
the legalization of the WTO in this manner will favour weaker actors in disputes, because 
strictly binding rules and procedures can protect the weak from the arbitrary use of the power 
by the strong (Moon, 2006; 2010). In contrast, others argue there is evidence that developing 
countries are in a disadvantageous position in the dispute settlement system with stronger states 
taking advantage of weaker states through the WTO dispute mechanism. Many argue that the 
current system of self-representation means that countries must have sufficient resources to not 
only monitor and recognize relevant WTO violations but also fund legal proceedings in cases 
in which their rights have been violated (Bown, 2005). Furthermore, the self-enforcing nature 
of the system puts the onus on complainant countries to threaten respondents that fail to adhere 
to WTO panel rulings. Moreover, it requires experienced bureaucratic agencies within each 
complainant country that administer trade remedy investigations with resources and access to 
provide sophisticated legal (and economic) analysis (Bown, 2004b). Finally, dispute settlement 
activity may be restricted due to special political relationships that may exist between countries. 
This may be particularly prevalent for developing economies that rely on foreign governments 
                                                          
2 Strictly speaking, a panel or appellate report is not automatically adopted because the dispute settlement body 
can decide by consensus not to adopt it. Because the dispute settlement body includes all WTO members, 
including both parties to the litigation, however, adoption is all but certain (Guzman and Simmons, 2005). 
for development assistance or through membership in a common preferential trade agreement 
(Holmes et al., 2003; Besson and Mehdi, 2004; Bown, 2005). 
 
Given the complicated nature of the dispute settlement system, it is imperative that time is 
taken to develop a methodological approach to identify the factors that influence developing 
countries’ participation in the dispute settlement mechanism. Examining developing nations in 
this manner is important even though the share of trade of developing countries still remains 
around 43% of global trade in general, its growth rate and tendency to increase deserve serious 
attention (WTO, 2016). As major developing countries like China, India, and Brazil are pivotal 
in expanding international trade flows, their participation and that of other developing countries 
within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism needs to be studied in greater detail. Another 
important reason is that among the total number of WTO member states, more than two-thirds 
are developing countries. Given that the WTO and its predecessor GATT have established a 
long tradition of consensus-based decision-making, the participation of developing countries 
within the process and their satisfaction with it, are critical for improving both the way in which 
the multilateral trading system operates but also its legitimacy as a strong and reliable 
institutional body.  
 
In order to analyse developing countries within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism this 
study seeks to answer the following hypotheses.  
H1: The stronger the intensity of developing countries' exports to other WTO members, the 
more likely developing countries are to initiate trade disputes, as the possibility of exporters 
encountering unfair treatment increases with the growth of export intensity.  
H2: The stronger the ability to retaliate, the more likely developing countries are to initiate 
trade disputes, as dispute settlement mechanism doesn’t have any enforcement power.  
H3: The stronger the level of economic power, the more likely developing countries are to 
initiate trade disputes, as the cost for the use of dispute settlement mechanism is huge. 
H4: The more likely a country is to encounter an economic threat from the target country, 
the less likely a developing country is to initiate trade disputes, as respondents may resort 
to retaliation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the utilization of the WTO dispute settlement 
process by providing both a very brief sketch of the DSU and by introducing some of the basic 
data on dispute resolution. Section 3 presents an assessment of the key literature of the 
theoretical arguments that inform our expectations about dispute initiation. Section 4 describes 
the methodological approach used in this study and the key hypotheses analysed as well as 
discussions of estimation results. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks and 
areas of future research opportunity. 
    
2. The utilization of the DSU by WTO members 
Since its formation, nations containing various levels of economic development and political 
ideologies have used the WTO Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) and in doing so shown respect 
for the rulings offered by its Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP). Because of this, the DSB has 
been considered to be the “the backbone of the multilateral trading system”.3 In the 24 years 
since its formation,  574 cases (see Figure 1 and Table A1) have been brought to the DSB, of 
which a significant number have been heard with decisions accepted and in some instances 
cases appealed making it potentially the busiest international dispute settlement system in the 
                                                          
3 Mike Moore, in WTO’s Unique System of Settling Disputes Nears 200 Cases in 2000, Press Release (June 5, 
2000) at (WTO, 2000). 
world.4 From the analysis of the 1995-2018 period, Figure 1 also shows that since 2002 there 
has been a downward trend in the number of disputes heard each year. In the first 10 years of 
operation the DSB managed on average 32 cases a year, however, since 2005 that has fallen to 





Figure 1: The number of DSB requests (appeals) 1995-2018 
 
 




In contrast to the gradual decline in case hearings has been the significant growth in trade 
export volumes over this time. With the only exception being a drop in trade due to the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008 and 2009 (see Figure 2), in which the developed economies of the 
world were more significantly impacted than other developing economies. The 1995 – 2017 
period also coincides with the significant rise of China, particularly in the years following its 
introduction into the WTO in 2001. In this instance, China’s merchandise trade with the rest of 
                                                          
4 By comparison, the International Criminal Court has only dealt with 25 cases over the last 16 years from which 
6 verdicts have been given (ICC, 2018), while the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which was 
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the world grew from $149 billion USD in 1995 to $266 billion USD in 2001, before 
skyrocketing to $2.3 trillion USD in 2017.  
 
Figure 2: Merchandise exports (Developed and Developing Country5, China) for 1995-2017 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
 
The dispute settlement system has been used by a wide range of developed and developing 
WTO member countries since 1995 (See Table A2). Although the US and the EU were by far 
the most frequent litigants, other industrialized countries (Canada, Japan, Korea, and Chile) 
and some developing countries (Brazil, India, Mexico, China, Thailand, and Indonesia) each 
initiated ten or more disputes during this study’s era of analysis. 
 
To get a more detailed appreciation of the nature of the disputes, Figure 3 assigns each bilateral 
dispute to one commercial sector. In this instance, the vegetable products and machinery, 
electrical, and transportation sectors were the two industrial sectors that experienced the highest 
number of complaints, of these some 156 of the 233 cases (vegetable sector) and 96 of the 115 
                                                          
5 Countries are classified according to the World Bank 2017 classification. In this study, developed countries are 
the members of high-income countries with per capita GNI over 12,055 US $, and the rest are classified as 
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cases (machinery, electrical, and transportation sector) where lodged by developed countries. 
The textile, footwear and headgear sector involved a significant number of dispute from 
developing countries, with the sector consisting of dispute cases relating, in particular, to the 
production of textile products. 
 
Figure 3: WTO disputes by industrial sector and category of complainant (1995-2018) 
 
 
    
Source: Author’s calculation by using the database of Dispute Settlement (WTO, 2018b) 
 
 
Despite its acceptance, the WTO DSU system has drawn criticism from many quarters about 
whether or not a level playing field exists among the various countries that have used its 
services. As such, critics argue the DSB is still susceptible to the types of power politics that 
have always existed within it and its predecessor GATT (Bouët and Metivier, 2017). While 
others argue that smaller countries simply shy away from participating in disputes or are simply 
unable to access the system (Bown and Hoekman, 2005). The reasons for this may include a 
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lack of resources, a lack of institutional capacity, or a lack of political will. Others have pointed 
out that overall smaller trade volumes also contribute to less usage by developing countries 
since there may be less potential for dispute (Kumar, 2006). While some argue the influence 
and power of the US (Kwon, 2016). Such areas of address form the basis of further assessment 
below. 
 
3. Assessment of the Literature 
 
The literature surrounding the WTO DSB and the DSP is abundant, bringing together an array 
of academic genres such as law, economics, trade, and political science. The main focus of 
these studies has been the effectiveness of the DSP in being able to adjust to the demands of a 
constantly evolving global trading environment, the DSP's lack of enforcement power, as well 
as its potential sources of bias against developing countries. This study examines the role of 
developing countries within the process and whether or not they are exposed to unfair bias 
within the dispute settlement process.  
 
Early studies on the involvement of developing economies within the dispute settlement 
mechanism focused on how participation by developing countries could be improved. Kruvila 
(1997) noted that the number and spectrum of participants as well as the range of issues 
involving the complaints made by developing nations in the WTO was wider than was the case 
under the previous GATT regime. While Park and Umbricht (2001), stated that developing 
nations were targeted relatively more by other nations within the WTO system. In addition, 
Hudec (1999) noted that developing nations initiated more disputes, however, they were also 
targeted more often than their developed country peers during the first-three years of the WTO 
than they were under the previous GATT regime.  
 
Since these early studies which were based on descriptive forms of statistical analysis, the types 
of empirical studies on the inclusion of developing countries within WTO disputes has become 
much more sophisticated in their methodological approach. Using a linear probabilistic model, 
Horn et al. (1999) found that due to their diversified trading portfolio and powerful economic 
size, G4 countries are over-represented in WTO disputes. In addition to this, Holmes et al. 
(2003) stated that the level of trade countries share with each other is an important indicator as 
to whether they will take part in WTO trade disputes. A similar study by Bown (2005) was 
conducted using a probit regression model. In this instance, the size of exports was identified 
as being a key determinant of whether to take part in the dispute settlement process. A recent 
study by Bouët and Metivier (2017) also supports this viewpoint. By building three different 
models, Bouët and Metivier (2017) found the number of products exported by 𝑖𝑖 to 𝑗𝑗 (rules 
based model) plays an important role in explaining the probability that 𝑖𝑖 initiates a dispute 
against 𝑗𝑗 at the DSP. While these studies sought to focus on the relative presence of developing 
nations within the dispute settlement mechanism, other studies have taken a more qualitative 
approach. Despite no formal evidence of bias, Busch and Reinhardt (2003) did argue that 
poorer economies are unable to negotiate significant concessions under the WTO format 
because they were unable to seek an early settlement to the dispute due to legal restraints. Such 
sentiments were shared by Besson and Mehdi (2004), who concluded that developing countries 
were less likely to achieve successful outcomes from the dispute process because of legal 
constraints, economic interdependencies, the threat of retaliation and international political 
factors.  
 
Bagwell and Staiger (2000) emphasize that the retaliation threat is a central component of the 
WTO dispute settlement system. The threat of retaliation provides an enforcement mechanism 
which helps to deter any violation of trade agreements. However, for such a mechanism to 
work the threat of retaliation must be credible (Wood, 2017). Therefore, as things currently 
stand, the procedure entails a bias against developing nations that have a weaker ability to 
retaliate.  In support of this, Bütler and Hauser (2000), Breuss (2001) and Bown (2004b) argue 
that the nature of any authorized sanction is likely to not only discourage some poorer countries 
from using the dispute settlement mechanism, but more specifically, to influence the final 
outcome of the litigation. Moreover, Bown (2002) showed within his WTO framework model, 
that terms-of-trade strength can determine the credibility of a retaliation threat. Therefore, even 
if small countries are authorized by the DSU at the term of the procedure to apply retaliatory 
measures, the impact on terms-of-trade is null and the threat is then regarded as non-credible. 
 
In addition to trade retaliation authorized by the WTO DS procedure, a country can exert a 
threat of retaliation against a trading partner via other available economic instruments (Besson 
and Mehdi, 2004). A key area of threat in this regard, is the provision of economic assistance 
offered to developing countries, in particular the form of bilateral economic assistance that 
often leads to closer economic interdependencies (Chang, 2002). During a trade dispute, the 
country that receives the economic assistance, may resist entering into the WTO dispute 
settlement process for fear that future assistance may be withheld. Another area of economic 
threat could be through the removal or cancelling of pre-existing preferential trade agreements 
between the two countries concerned. In this instance, the threat of economic relationship 
deterioration influences the litigant behaviours during a dispute settlement. The starting point 
of this economic threat can then come either from the illegal trade practice (the defendant is 
economically depending on the plaintiff, which will seek to sanction it while carrying a 
complaint) or even from the complaint (the plaintiff is economically dependent on the 
defendant, which is bothered by the plaintiff initiative and will then seek to sanction him) 
(Besson and Mehdi, 2004).  
 
The issue of legal costs is another significant issue, with studies by Breuss (2001), Bütler and 
Hauser (2000); Busch and Reinhardt (2000, 2003), Bown (2004a), Ahn et al. (2013) stressing 
that legal costs, and thus the legal capacity of each country to support these costs, influences 
the resolution of the dispute being carried. Given the legal procedures for managing a dispute 
can take more than 3 years to play out there are significant costs associated with the process. 
These costs can relate to not only material costs for lawyers and diplomats wages (Guzman and 
Simmons, 2002) but also the costs associated with gaining access to information about the 
complex legal characteristics of the litigation. Many therefore argue that given these costs, 
developing countries are not as well equipped to fight legal challenges nor are they as capable 
of identifying suspicious trade barriers. 
 
The issue of international political factors can also influence country positions during the 
dispute settlement process. Of the vast amount of literature on the subject, realist and neo-
realist models have examined the economic and political impact of the power relationships that 
exist between nations and the need for hegemonic powers to create and maintain the 
frameworks of international organizations (Kindleberger, 1981; Puchala, 2005). From an 
international trade perspective, the notion of free trade has been pushed by the most powerful 
economies in a way that seeks to weaken others while also strengthening their global 
hegemonic grip. As such, the WTO, an organization that champions free trade was created by 
hegemonic powers in a way that includes small countries because of their relative weakness 
and of their incapacity to resist to the influence of large dominant economies (Besson and 
Mehdi, 2004). Applied to the dispute settlement mechanism, the transposition of such a 
theoretical paradigm can therefore help to explain some of the determinants which can bias the 
final result of the litigation against developing nations. In this perspective, trade disputes are 
partly generated by political relationships and are the result of the structures of power and 
conflicts between countries. Power is traditionally defined by its means, i.e. by the resources 
which make it possible to impose ones will on others (or to prevent the others from being 
opposed to its will). Iida (1999) argues that power, through bilateral relationships can influence 
dispute settlement procedures, in a manner which allows for favourable verdicts for parties that 
may engage in trade practices that deviate from WTO rules. In addition, Griffin (2002) 
examines how military factors may potentially impact the final outcome of a trade dispute. In 
this instance, it was assumed that the greater the gap that exists in military spending between 
two parties the greater the probability that the settlement procedure can be influenced. The 
results from the study showed that the probability of a dispute settlement panel being formed 
depends on relative differences in military expenditure (as a share of GDP). 
 
Furthermore, Allee (2005) even distinguished the level of democracies as factors that influence 
settlement performance gaps. In contrast, Moon (2006) showed that the procedural or 
substantive dispute outcomes of the WTO were not significantly affected by power disparity. 
However, the study did also note that stricter substantive provisions of recently included 
agreements were more advantageous to developed countries. In a subsequent study by Kim 
(2008), which compared the WTO regime with that of the GATT era, it was found that 
developed countries, ones with greater capacity, are much more likely to utilize dispute 
settlement in the WTO than developing countries. Moreover, the benefits that have resulted 
from institutional change have accrued disproportionately to developed member countries in 
the WTO. Nonetheless, Davis and Bermeo (2009), argued that some developing countries, 
having overcome initial huddles with participating experiences, were likely to participate more 
actively. In this instance, they found that prior association with the trade adjudication process 
is a strong predictor of future dispute initiation for developing countries. Experience gained 
through participation in the dispute process as either a complainant or a defendant increases 
the probability of filing a complaint. Meanwhile, a more recent research by Lee (2018) finds 
that the “legalized WTO” favors developing countries more than the “less legalized or non-
legalized GATT” because the legalization of an international institution makes a member 
country’s economic capacity less important while making its previous experiences important 
for its use of the dispute settlement mechanism. In contrast, Ahn et al. (2013), found that the 
symmetric information gap that might encourage smaller developing nations to delve more into 
the litigation processes. However, in order to overcome informational asymmetry or improve 
the level of communication between disputing parties in the WTO there is a need to potentially 
reform the consultation process. 
 
4. Methodological Approach 
 
In this section, we detail our model to examine the performance of developing countries within 
the WTO dispute settlement process. We construct our database from the WTO website, which 
provides a list of all initiated disputes from 1995 to 2018. Following Horn et al (1999), Busch 
and Reinhardt (2003), and Bouët and Metivier (2017), we divide disputes involving more than 
one plaintiff into as many as bilateral cases as there are complainants. Using data obtained from 
the WTO website, we find that 574 dispute settlement mechanisms are initiated from 1995 to 
2018. As shown in table A2, a total of 109 countries and regions (45 developed countries and 
64 developing countries) participated in the dispute settlement mechanism. At the bilateral 
level, there are 615 trade disputes, among which 210 were initiated by developing countries 
and 405 by developed countries. Further, we find that out of 210 disputes initiated by 
developing countries, only 93 choose to settle trade disputes through third party rulings, while 
117 choose negotiated settlement6. In contrast, developed countries are more inclined to settle 
trade disputes through third party rulings, with 207 out of 405 measures settled by this way. 
 
The goal of this paper is to identify the influencing factors for developing countries’ 
participation in dispute settlement mechanisms (a developing country initiate a dispute against 
another country). As Lee (2018) points out, participation in dispute settlement as a complainant 
is regarded as a benefit since dispute settlement benefits start from participation in dispute 
settlement. Participation itself is also important because there is no disadvantage for developing 
countries in terms of winning verdicts or compliance from defendants (Busch and Pelc, 2015).  
We now provide a more detail description of the variables used in our study. 
 
4.1 Dependant variable: 
 
Using data obtained from the WTO website, we construct a binary dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: a 
dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if country 𝑖𝑖 has filed at least one complaint against 
country 𝑗𝑗 in year t, 0 if not. Since we are using bilateral annual data, the proportion of initiating 
trade disputes between countries is very small, that is to say, the frequency of  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 is very 
small and belongs to “rare events”. If a general MLE (such as Probit or Logit) method is used 
to estimate the binary choice model, there will be rare event biases. There are usually two ways 
to solve the rare event bias. One is the rare events logistic estimation (stata package: relogit) 
                                                          
6 Here, the negotiated settlement means the procedure that two disputants settle their disputes without the rulings 
of the panel or the Appellate Body, whereas the third party ruling means the procedure in which the panel rules 
or the Appellate Body adjudicates for the settlement of disputes. ( Lee, 2018, p.9) 
 
proposed by King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b)7. The other one is to use the asymmetric extreme 
value distribution to obtain a complementary log-log model (stata package: cloglog) to correct 
the rare event bias. This paper conducts a regression analysis based on the logit model, and 
then use the two methods to solve the rare event bias. The basic empirical model used in our 
study is as follows:  
 
                                             Pr�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝛼𝛼,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = ∅(α + β𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
 
Where∅(∙) is the logistic cumulative distribution function, X is the set of the explanatory 
variables and β the set of the coefficients to be estimated. Since our study focuses on developing 
countries, thus, 𝑖𝑖 represents the complainant which is limited to developing countries and 𝑗𝑗 
represents the respondent, which can be any WTO member country. We estimate the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of developing countries initiate a dispute. 
The independent variables are categorized into 5 categories: export intensity, retaliation 
capability, economic power, economic threat, and other related control variables.  
 
4.2 Independent variables: 
 
 
1. Export intensity 
Export intensity is represented by the number of products exported by country 𝑖𝑖 to country 𝑗𝑗 
(𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and the share of country 's exports received by country 𝑗𝑗 (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) in 
year t. According to the ‘rules based’ model proposed by Bouët and Metivier (2017), the 
number of exports is an important factor that affect the complainants desire to initiate a dispute, 
as the probability that an exporter encounters unfair treatment increases with the number of 
                                                          
7 King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) developed STATA command program ‘relogit’, which can be downloaded 
from the author’s website (https://gking.harvard.edu/relogit). 
exported products. Similarly, if country 𝑖𝑖 has a high level of export share to country 𝑗𝑗, then it 
is more likely that country 𝑖𝑖 uses the dispute settlement mechanism to deal with trade disputes, 
because the dispute involves most of its export interests. Using data obtained from BACI 
databases, we calculated the number of products as well as the share of exports by country 𝑖𝑖 to 
country 𝑗𝑗 from 1995 to 20178. Both of the two variables are expected to have a positive effect 
on developing countries participation in the dispute settlement mechanism9. Therefore, as 
stated in hypothesis H1: The stronger the intensity of developing countries' exports to other 
WTO members, the more likely developing countries are to initiate trade disputes. 
 
2. Retaliation capability 
Retaliation capability is represented by the number of products imported by country 𝑖𝑖 from 
country 𝑗𝑗 ( 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and the share of country 𝑖𝑖 's total imports from country 
𝑗𝑗 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) in year t. We need to be aware that there is no strong enforcement mechanism 
under the dispute resolution mechanism. The DSU stipulates that if the losing party does not 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the panel or the Appellate Body within a 
reasonable period of time, the complainant may be authorized to retaliate. However, the lack 
of retaliation for the respondent may make it impossible for the complainant to file a complaint. 
The capacity to retaliate through trade policy is determined by whether the retaliating country 
accounts for a sufficient amount of its trading partner’s exports (Bown, 2004a).  In this instance, 
we select two variables 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to measure the complainant’s capacity 
to retaliate. The raw-data for these two variables is collected from BACI database, and has been 
further analysed by the author’s of this study. We expect both of the two variables to have a 
                                                          
8 The database is available until 2017. 
9 However, it should be noted that the greater the export intensity, the greater the risk of retaliation from the 
defendants, and thus preventing developing countries from initiating trade disputes. However, according to the 
previous study (i.e. Bouët and Metivier, 2017), this negative effect is less likely to occur, so we ignore this negative 
effect here. 
positive effect on a country’s decision to participate in the DSP. Therefore, as stated in 
hypothesis H2: The stronger the ability to retaliate, the more likely developing countries are 
to initiate trade disputes. 
 
3. Economic power 
The third category of variables measures the impact that economic power or economic capacity 
has on developing countries participation in the dispute settlement mechanism. Economic 
power is represented by the gross national income (𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of developing country 𝑖𝑖 and its share 
of total world trade (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) in year t. Data of GNI is collected from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and share of total world trade is calculated by authors using 
trade data from the BACI database. Considering the duration and legal resources of the conflict 
needed, there must be a huge cost for the use of dispute settlement mechanism. The probability 
of a country filing a complaint depends on its economic ability to bear the cost. Therefore, both 
of the variables are expected to have a positive effect, as stated in hypothesis H3: The stronger 
the level of economic power, the more likely developing countries are to initiate trade disputes.  
 
4. Economic threat 
The fourth category of explanatory variables consists of proxies which measure the threat of 
political and economic retaliation effects on developing countries performance. In order to 
assess this, two indicators are used to understand the types of pressure WTO member countries 
can place on developing nations. In this regard, we use bilateral Official Development 
Assistance per capita received by a developing country from WTO member countries 
(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂_𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), using data collected from the OECD. From a retaliation threat perspective, we 
might expect a negative relationship between 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and ODA_per𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Moreover, a developing 
country that is reliant on the developed country for bilateral assistance may exercise self-
constraint during the dispute process. The second indicator 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if there is Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in effect with the respondent 
before t year, and zero if no PTA is in place10. As developing country 𝑖𝑖 enjoys preferential 
treatment in the country 𝑗𝑗’s market, the former might fear losing this kind of privileged trading 
position if it opposes its trade partner in a formal dispute. A regional trade agreement results in 
close trade interdependence which gives the respondent a way in which they may exert the 
threat of retaliation which is in addition to the trade dispute. Therefore, the expected 
relationship between 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is negative.  Therefore, as stated in hypothesis H4: The 
more likely a country is to encounter an economic threat from the target country, the less likely 
a developing country is to initiate trade disputes, as respondents may resort to retaliation.  
 
5. Other related control variables 
The fifth category also includes two variables:  the share of trade as a proportion of GDP 
(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and the total population (𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). We follow Lee (2018) by using the average value 
of  country 𝑖𝑖 and country 𝑗𝑗 to describe the two variables. For example, ‘𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’ refers to the 
average share of trade out of GDP between country 𝑖𝑖  and country 𝑗𝑗  in year t. These two 
variables are added to control the potential effect of the characteristics of sample countries.  
 
4.3 Data description and empirical results 
Data summary statistics are shown in Table 1. As the data for the dependent variables can only 
be obtained until 2017, our sample is bilateral country-level data from 1995 to 2017. The 
variables of 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are logged due to high dispersions, 
and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are expressed as percentages.  It 
                                                          
10 Data from 1995 to 2015 are from the world bank group (Hofmann, Osnago, and Ruta, 2017), and data from 
2015 to 2017 are from DESTA (constructed by Dür, Baccini, and Elsig, 2014). 
can be seen from Table 1 that the frequency of occurrence of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 is only 0.08%, which can 
be regarded as a rare event.  Therefore, we first perform a normal Logit regression and then 
further analyze it using the rare event bias correction model. 
 
Table 1:  Summary statistics of variables 
 
Considering the potential multicollinearity problem that may exist between the explanatory 
variables, we first examine the correlations among right hand side variables before conducting 
the formal analysis. We can see from Table A4, that there is no high correlation between 
variables, so it can be considered that there is no multicollinearity problem in our analysis 
model.  
 Count Mean Median s.d. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Initiating a dispute (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 0.0008 0 0.03 0 1 
Independent variable 
Export intensity       
Number of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, log) 216,021 2.81 2.4 2.17 0 8.47 
Share of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 0.82 0.02 3.76 0 91.29 
Retaliation capability 
 
      
Number of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇) 216,021 3.14 2.77 2.3 0 8.47 
Share of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 0.83 0.02 3.25 0 85.54 
Economic power 
 
      
Gross national income (𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇) 216,021 23.72 23.4 2.05 19.07 30.13 
Share of total world trade (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 0.32 0.04 1.05 0 11.62 
Economic threat 
 
      
ODA per capita (ODA_per𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 0.41 0 5.5 -170.25 481.06 
PTA (𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 0.12 0 0.32 0 1 
Other related control variables       
Share of trade out of GDP (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 216,021 80.38 74.94 32.39 10.36 316.48 
Total population (𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇) 216,021 16.84 16.76 1.38 10.94 21.03 
 
As mentioned earlier, we hypothesize that a decision by developing countries initiating a 
dispute against WTO members depends on the factors of export intensity, retaliation capacity, 
economic power, and level of economic threat. The estimation results are presented in Tables 
2 through 5. They are organized into three groups representing ‘Full sample’, ‘Early WTO 
(1995-2005)’, and ‘Late WTO (2006-2017)’. As the research results may vary with the 
defendant countries, we further divided the samples into ‘All’, ‘Developed’, and ‘Developing’ 
country groups. Table 2 shows the estimation results of logit regressions for separate sample 
analysis. In terms of first category variables, which capture the export intensity present in a 
trade dispute,  the coefficient results of the number of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are significant and 
positive (0.83~1.41) in all estimations. This finding is line with the expectation that increases 
in number of exports should lead to an increase in probability of initiating a trade dispute. The 
other export intensity variable, share of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is found to be positive and 
statistically significant in the sample as a whole and in the developed country group 
(0.04~0.09), however, the sign was negative for the developing country group (-0.33~-0.17). 
We argue this is likely because the potential negative effect of export intensity on the initiation 
of trade disputes may exist between developing countries. That is, the greater the export 
intensity, the greater the risk of retaliation from the defendants, and thus preventing developing 
countries from initiating trade disputes against developing countries. In terms of the second 
category of variables, which capture the retaliation capability present in a trade dispute, the 
results regarding the number of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) were found to be positive and 
statistically significant as predicted in all estimations (0.24~0.84); the exception being equation 
(5) which dealt with developed country groups. However, the results regarding share of imports 
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) were mixed and had limited effects on the initiation of trade disputes. In terms 
of the third category of variables, which captures the level of economic power present in a trade 
dispute, the results for gross national income (𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) was found to have predictive effect for 
both the sample as a whole and the developed country group (0.22~0.51), while having a mixed 
impact on the developing county group. In addition, the coefficients results for the share of total 
world trade (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are negative which is not in line with expectations. In terms of fourth 
category of variables, which captures the level of economic threat present in a trade dispute, 
both the ODA per capita (ODA_per𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and the PTA (𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) were shown to have  a negative 
effect on both the sample as a whole and the developed country group, while coefficient signs 
for the developing country groups are mixed and insignificant11. This suggests that, developing 
countries are more afraid of the economic threat posed by developed countries than other 
developing economies, as the economic threats from developed countries have seriously 
hindered developing countries initiating formal trade dispute proceedings at the WTO. 
 
As mentioned earlier, our study uses rare event logistic regressions and complementary log-
log regressions in order to correct the rare event bias. The estimation results from these analyses 
are shown in Tables 3 and 4. In general, these empirical findings are similar to those displayed 
in Table 2. More specifically, the number of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) were shown to have a 
statistically significant effect in all estimations. The results for share of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
were found to be positive and statistically significant for both the sample overall and for 
developed country groups, while the effects were statistically negative for developing 
defendant countries. In regards to the number of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), our findings were 
positive and statistically significant for almost all estimations, while the share of imports 
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) was found to have statistically significant positive effect on initiating trade 
disputes but only when the target countries was a developing economy.  
                                                          
11 At the early stage of WTO, ODA's investment data from developing countries were very few. Therefore, the 
variable ODA per capita was droped automatically in the analysis of Equation (5). 
 
The coefficients of gross national income (𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) were found to be significant for both the 
sample as a whole and for developed country groups but were mixed for developing country 
groups, as shown in Table 2. This suggests that economic power is an important factor for 
developing countries when considering whether they should enter into a trade disputes against 
a developed country. However, our results also show that it becomes significantly less 
important when the target country is a developing country. Moreover, our estimates for the 
share of total world trade (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) were also similar to those in documented in Table 2, 
although the negative effects are not in line with expectations, these effects are insignificant 
over the 2006-2017 period when the target countries in question are more developed.  
 
In other results, the ODA per capita (ODA_per𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  was found to have a predictive negative 
effect for all estimations shown in Table 4. However, Table 3 shows the impact becomes 
positive when the target countries are developing countries. Similarly, when the target country 
is a developing economy, the negative impact of the PTA (𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) becomes less significant, 
especially over the 2006-2017 period. Such a finding demonstrates the fact that economic 
threats do not affect a country’s decision to enter into a formal WTO trade disputes against 
developing countries, which may have something to do with the limited retaliatory capacity of 
these poorer economies. 
 
Finally, in reference to Moon and Perron (2018) and Lee (2018), seemingly unrelated 
estimations 12 are conducted, in order to test whether there are any statistically significant 
                                                          
12 Seemingly unrelated estimation, proposed by Zellner (1962), is a generalization of a linear regression model 
that comprises several individual regression equations that are linked by the fact that their disturbances are 
correlated (Moon and Perron, 2018). It allows us to compare the estimated coefficients of several regression 
equations (Lee, 2018). 
differences in the coefficients of the main explanatory variables for the different periods and 
different target countries. The results from these analyses are shown in Table 5. Moreover, 
equations (1) and (2) document the results of the combined regressions for the two different 
periods analysed namely the earlier and later years of the WTO handling of disputes. Through 
the comparison of the main explanatory variable coefficients of these two periods, we were 
able to ascertain that there are statistically significant differences in the coefficients of the three 
independent variables, number of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share of total world trade (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 
and ODA per capita (ODA_per𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). The positive effect of number of imports ((𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
representing the retaliatory ability of initiating trade disputes increases over the later WTO 
period, while the negative effect of ODA per capita (ODA_per𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) , which represents the 
economic threat, also becomes stronger during the same period of time. Finally, the share of 
total world trade (𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is statistically insignificant during this later period. These results 
show that in more recent years, the retaliation capacity of developing countries themselves 
(plaintiffs) has had a stronger influence on whether to initiate trade disputes, while at the same 
time they are more afraid of the economic threat from the defendants.  
 
Equations (3) and (4) show the combined regression results for both the different categories of 
country development level and the sample as a whole. From our analyses, we demonstrate that 
as the accused country faces different nations, the factors of influence change. For example, 
when the defendants are developing countries, the effects of number of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
and share of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) representing export intensity on initiation of trade disputes 
become weaker, while the positive effect of share of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), which represents 
the ability to retaliate, becomes stronger. At the same time, it seems that the plaintiff’s own 
economic strength and the defendant's economic threat become less important when the 
defendant is a developing country.  
 
Equations (5) and (6) present the results of the combined regressions for developed and 
developing countries in the years immediately following the formation of the WTO (1995 – 
2005). The coefficients of the two independent variables, share of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and 
gross national income (𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are found to be statistically different. The results are similar to 
the overall comparisons given in (equation (3) vs equation (4)), when the defendant is a 
developing country, the positive effects of 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   are weakened and no 
longer statistically significant.  
 
Finally, equations (7) and (8) present the results of the combined regressions for developed and 
the developing countries in more recent years (2006 -2017). From our analysis, we found that 
there are statistically significant differences in the coefficients of the four independent variables, 
share of exports (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share of imports (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share of total world trade 
(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and PTA (𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) between the developed and developing groups during the late 
WTO period. According to the change of coefficient, we can infer that the retaliatory ability of 
the plaintiff is more effective when the defendant is a developing country during this time, and 
the economic threat from developed countries is more effective at restraining the plaintiff from 
initiating a trade dispute.
Table 2: Estimation results of logit regressions: separate-sample analysis 
Sample type Full sample Early WTO (1995-2005) Late WTO (2006-2017) 
Respondent All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing 
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
0.97*** 1.38*** 0.95*** 1.01*** 1.41*** 0.96*** 0.88*** 1.08*** 0.83*** 
(0.12) (0.24) (0.17) (0.16) (0.31) (0.23) (0.18) (0.36) (0.28) 
 
0.04*** 0.07*** -0.19** 0.04** 0.06*** -0.33 0.04** 0.09*** -0.17* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) 
 
0.42*** 0.29* 0.57*** 0.24** 0.21 0.48*** 0.67*** 0.45* 0.84*** 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.21) (0.16) (0.14) (0.25) (0.22) 
 
-0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 0.04 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
0.22*** 0.36*** 0.03 0.33*** 0.45*** -0.05 0.25** 0.51*** 0.26 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.25) (0.12) (0.19) (0.24) 
 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.28** -0.24** -0.30** -0.19 -0.03 -0.05 -0.36* 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22) 
 
-0.05*** -0.05*** -0.20 -0.04*** -0.05***  -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.15 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.64) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.08) (0.55) 
 
-0.94*** -2.10*** -0.44 -1.29*** -1.51*** -1.70** -0.69** -2.98*** 0.24 
(0.23) (0.45) (0.35) (0.41) (0.58) (0.71) (0.30) (0.85) (0.46) 
 
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
-0.24** -0.26 -0.27* -0.24* -0.15 -0.47** -0.24 -0.29 -0.28 
(0.11) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.24) (0.22) (0.15) (0.30) (0.21) 
Constant -14.40
*** -19.51*** -9.24*** -15.65*** -23.54*** -1.63 -16.91*** -22.51*** -17.29*** 
(2.22) (3.50) (3.23) (3.39) (5.02) (5.53) (3.55) (5.99) (4.98) 
Observations 216,021 89,362 126,659 89,255 37,702 51,553 126,766 51,660 75,106 
Pseudo- R2 0.34 0.42 0.26 0.35 0.41 0.27 0.35 0.45 0.30 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 3: Estimation results of rare event logit regressions: separate-sample analysis 
Sample type Full sample Early WTO (1995-2005) Late WTO (2006-2017) 
Respondent All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing 
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
0.96*** 1.36*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 1.37*** 0.92*** 0.86*** 1.03*** 0.76*** 
(0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.16) (0.30) (0.18) (0.15) (0.31) (0.15) 
 
0.04*** 0.07*** -0.17** 0.04*** 0.06*** -0.24 0.04** 0.09*** -0.14 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
 
0.41*** 0.28* 0.55*** 0.23*** 0.18 0.43*** 0.65*** 0.42* 0.81*** 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.20) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.17) 
 
-0.01 -0.03 0.04*** -0.01 -0.03 0.06* -0.00 -0.03 0.05** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
0.22*** 0.35*** 0.02 0.31*** 0.42*** -0.06 0.23** 0.46*** 0.22 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.10) (0.16) (0.20) 
 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.27*** -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
 
-0.05*** -0.06*** 0.05 -0.05*** -0.06***  -0.22*** -0.23*** 0.23*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
-0.92*** -2.04*** -0.40 -1.24*** -1.42*** -1.56** -0.67** -2.80** 0.29 
(0.22) (0.44) (0.31) (0.38) (0.50) (0.74) (0.27) (1.14) (0.35) 
 
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01* 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
-0.23** -0.25 -0.26** -0.23* -0.14 -0.44** -0.22* -0.26 -0.28** 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13) (0.21) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22) (0.13) 
Constant -14.31
*** -19.13*** -8.90*** -15.25*** -22.73*** -1.48 -16.46*** -21.11*** -15.72*** 
(2.29) (3.47) (3.11) (2.90) (4.23) (2.99) (3.86) (6.56) (4.52) 
Observations 216,021 89,362 126,659 89,255 37,702 51,553 126,766 51,660 75,106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 4: Estimation results of complementary log-log regressions: separate-sample analysis 
Sample type Full sample Early WTO (1995-2005) Late WTO (2006-2017) 
Respondent All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing 
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
0.97*** 1.37*** 0.94*** 1.01*** 1.40*** 0.95*** 0.88*** 1.09*** 0.83*** 
(0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.16) (0.29) (0.18) (0.15) (0.30) (0.15) 
 
0.04*** 0.06*** -0.19** 0.04*** 0.06*** -0.33 0.04** 0.09*** -0.17** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
 
0.42*** 0.30** 0.56*** 0.24*** 0.21 0.48*** 0.67*** 0.46** 0.83*** 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.23) (0.17) 
 
-0.01 -0.03 0.03** -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 0.04** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
0.22*** 0.36*** 0.03 0.33*** 0.44*** -0.05 0.25** 0.50*** 0.26 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.20) 
 
-0.07* -0.07 -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.19 -0.03 -0.05 -0.36*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
 
-0.04*** -0.05*** -0.19*** -0.04*** -0.05***  -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.15** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
-0.94*** -2.08*** -0.45 -1.28*** -1.48*** -1.70** -0.71*** -3.01*** 0.23 
(0.22) (0.43) (0.31) (0.37) (0.50) (0.74) (0.27) (1.12) (0.34) 
 
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01* 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
-0.24** -0.26* -0.27** -0.24* -0.16 -0.46** -0.24* -0.28 -0.28** 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13) (0.20) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22) (0.13) 
Constant -14.43
*** -19.51*** -9.24*** -15.66*** -23.28*** -1.66 -16.90*** -22.67*** -17.28*** 
(2.27) (3.42) (3.10) (2.89) (4.19) (2.98) (3.83) (6.43) (4.50) 
Observations 216,021 89,362 126,659 89,255 37,702 51,553 126,766 51,660 75,106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5: Seemingly unrelated estimation of logit regressions 
Sample type Full sample Full sample  Early WTO (1995-2005) Late WTO (2006-2017) 
Respondent Early WTO  Late WTO  Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing 
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
1.01*** 0.88*** 1.38*** 0.95*** 1.41*** 0.96*** 1.08*** 0.83*** 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.13) (0.30) (0.18) (0.31) (0.15) 
 
0.04*** 0.04** 0.07*** -0.19** 0.06*** -0.33 0.09*** -0.17** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.23) (0.02) (0.09) 
 
0.24*** 0.67*** 0.29** 0.57*** 0.21 0.48*** 0.45** 0.84*** 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.20) (0.11) (0.23) (0.17) 
 
-0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.03** -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
0.33*** 0.25** 0.36*** 0.03 0.45*** -0.05 0.51*** 0.26 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) 
 
-0.24*** -0.03 -0.07 -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.19 -0.05 -0.36*** 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) 
 
-0.04*** -0.22*** -0.05*** -0.20*** -0.05***  -0.21*** -0.15** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.06) 
 
-1.29*** -0.69** -2.10** -0.44 -1.51*** -1.70** -2.98*** 0.24 
(0.38) (0.27) (0.44) (0.31) (0.50) (0.74) (1.14) (0.35) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Coefficients in bold type imply significant differences (p < 0.10) between two different groups (i.e. 
Early WTO vs Late WTO; Developed vs Developing).
4.4 Discussion of Results  
 
 
Our study analyzes the factors that affect the initiation of trade disputes by developing countries 
using four specific characteristics (export intensity, retaliation capability, economic power, and 
economic threat).  Of the four hypotheses analyzed, almost all of the variables have recorded 
the kinds of statistically significant results that we expected prior to conducting our empirical 
analyses.  
 
Firstly, the positive effects of the export intensity variables show that a developing country is 
more likely to initiate a trade dispute against WTO members as the number and value of exports 
increases, which are in line with the rules-based model proposed by (Bouët and Metivier, 
2017). As mentioned above, as the quantity of exported products increases, the possibility of 
unfair treatment against exporters also increases. Moreover, from the comparison between 
developed and developing countries, we showed that export intensity has a stronger impact on 
initiating trade disputes against developed countries. This suggests that exports to developed 
countries are at greater risk of unfair treatment, making them more likely to initiate trade 
disputes. 
 
Secondly, the positive effects of retaliation capability variables (especially for the variable of 
(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) show that it is more likely for developing countries to initiate trade disputes 
when the retaliation capacity is high. Furthermore, the effect of retaliation capability becomes 
stronger in in more recent years than in the 1995-2005 period of analysis. This may be due to 
the lack of enforcement power of the dispute settlement mechanism, as the complainants are 
increasingly aware of the importance of retaliation capability. We also established that 
retaliation capability has a more significant impact on developing countries filing a complaint 
against developing countries than against developed ones. This shows that the role of retaliation 
is more pronounced when trade disputes are initiated between countries with similar levels of 
development.  
 
Thirdly, the 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which represents economic power, is an important factor in initiating trade 
disputes against developed countries but the effect is insignificant when the potential defendant 
countries are developing countries. The results for the developed country group confirms 
hypothesis H3 that the stronger the level of economic power, the more likely developing 
countries are to initiate trade disputes, as the cost for the use of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is huge. Furthermore, our findings also provide some support for the capacity 
theory but go against the underlining notion of the legalization theory (Lee, 2018) that 
economic capability does not determine the initiation of trade disputes. From this perspective, 
we can conclude that only when the developing countries initiate trade disputes against the 
developing countries, the trade dispute settlement mechanism is relatively legalized. 
 
Finally, the negative effects of the economic threat variables, especially for developed groups, 
show that a developing country is less likely to initiate a trade dispute against developed 
countries when the developing country is reliant on a developed country for bilateral aid 
assistance as well as a series of preferential trade terms. From our results, we can concur that 
developing countries exercise self-constraint during the litigation process in order to not 
jeopardize any privileged economic arrangements that they depend on. The negative findings 
of ODA per capita and PTA highlight that the reluctance that many developing countries may 
have in using the dispute settlement system in the first place (Griffin, 2002). The costs 
associated with launching legal procedures are significant and given the repercussions they 
may face through the removal of bilateral aid programs which act as an important source of 
social and economic support, many developing countries may think twice before entering into 
any formal legal hearings.  
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Our research examined the factors that affect a developing country’s decision to file a 
complaint against WTO members utilizing bilateral country level data from the 1995 to 2017 
period. In light of our findings, there is sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that the export 
intensity, retaliation capability, economic power, and economic threat are the main factors that 
determine the initiation of trade disputes by developing countries. This means that not all 
developing countries can participate in trade dispute settlement mechanisms, to be specific, the 
stronger the export intensity, the retaliation capability, and the economic power, as well as the 
less economic threat, the more likely developing countries are to initiate trade disputes against 
other WTO members. 
 
Moreover, through the seemingly unrelated estimations of different periods and different target 
countries of the accused, we further find that: (1) overall, export intensity has a stronger impact 
on initiating trade disputes against developed countries. (2) the retaliation capability has a more 
significant impact on developing countries filing a complaint against developing countries than 
against developed ones, with the effect being more pronounced over the 2006-2017 period. (3) 
the impact of economic power on initiating trade disputes is stronger when the potential 
defendants are from developed countries. (4) Economic threats from developed countries are 
more likely to deter developing countries from initiating trade disputes against them. 
 
Given the significance of our findings, further areas of empirical endeavour now appeal. In 
particular, the factors that influence the probability of a dispute settlement panel forming would 
be an interesting and relevant area to better understand. In addition to this, future research 
should also focus on examining the types of case, in terms of both industry and legal 
infringement areas that are most likely responsible for achieving the best dispute settlement 
outcomes for developing countries. Finally, a clearer understanding of why so many WTO 
trade disputes are initiated but never completed. Given the costs associated with initiating a 





Table A1: Current Status of Disputes 
Type Definition  Number 
In consultations Complainant requests consultations with respondent, no dispute 
panel established and no withdrawal or mutually agreed solution 
notified. 
174 
Panel established, but 
not yet composed 
The dispute settlement body has agreed to establish a panel, but 
the panelists have not yet been chosen. 
29 
Panel composed Panelists have been selected according to procedures laid down 
in Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 8. The panel report 
has not been adopted or appealed, and no withdrawal or mutually 
agreed solution has been notified. 
30 
Panel report circulated Panel report circulated to members, not yet appealed or adopted. 2 
Panel report under 
appeal 
Cases currently being reviewed by the Appellate Body following 
appeal of the panel report. 
10 
Appellate Body report 
circulated 
Appellate Body circulated to members but not yet appealed. 0 
Reports adopted, no 
further action required 
Appellate Body and/or panel reports adopted. Case resolved 
without need for respondent to take further action. 
35 
Reports adopted, with 
recommendation to 
bring measure(s) into 
conformity 
Appellate Body and/or Panel finds the disputed trade measure(s) 
to be inconsistent with WTO law. Recommendation to bring the 




notified by respondent 
The respondent has notified that is has implemented the DSB 
recommendation to bring the disputed measure into conformity 






Parties have notified an agreement on implementation 23 
Compliance 
proceedings ongoing 
If the parties disagree whether the respondent has implemented 
the recommendations and rulings, either party can request a 






Appellate Body and/or panel report under Article 21.5 Adopted, 




with finding(s) of non-
compliance 
Appellate Body and/or panel report under Article 21.5 adopted, 





(incl. 22.6 arbitration) 
If the Member concerned does not comply with the DSB 
recommendations and rulings within the prescribed time, the 
complainant may request permission to impose retaliation 




Appellate body/compliance panel find DSB recommendations 
have not been fully implemented; authorization for complainant 
to suspend concessions or other obligations granted. 
15 
Authority for panel 
lapsed 
Panel proceedings suspended under Article 12.12 of the DSU, 
and not resumed after 12 months. 
16 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
Request withdrawn, measure terminated, or mutually agreed 
solution under Article 3.6 of the DSU notified prior to adoption 
of Appellate Body and/or panel report (s). 
112 
Source: World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement  












United States 99 96 199 
European Union (formerly EC) 131 164 150 
Other industrialized countries    
Canada 39 23 145 
Japan 25 15 203 
Argentina 22 22 62 
Korea, Republic of 20 18 126 
Chile 10 13 48 
New Zealand 9  61 
Australia 8 16 108 
Panama 7 1 10 
Taiwan 6  121 
Switzerland 5  26 
Hungary 5 7 2 
Norway 5  102 
Qatar 4  13 
Poland 3 1 1 
United Arab Emirates 1 1 7 
Antigua and Barbuda 1   
Czech Republic 1 2  
Denmark 1 1  
Hong Kong, China 1  22 
Singapore 1  54 
Uruguay 1 1 14 
Belgium  3  
Bahrain, Kingdom of  1 13 
Barbados   4 
Germany  2  
Spain  3  
France  4  
United Kingdom  3  
Greece  3  
Croatia  1  
Ireland  3  
Iceland   18 
Israel   11 
Italy  1  
Saint Kitts and Nevis   3 
Kuwait, the State of   1 
Netherlands  3  
Oman   13 
Portugal  1  
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  2 47 
Slovak Republic  3  
Sweden  1  
Trinidad and Tobago  2 4 
Developing countries 
Brazil 33 16 139 
India 25 25 158 
Mexico 25 15 103 
China 22 43 171 
Thailand 14 4 93 
Indonesia 11 14 38 
Guatemala 9 2 52 
Ukraine 9 4 40 
Honduras 8  29 
Russian Federation 7 9 70 
Colombia 5 5 60 
Costa Rica 5 1 15 
Pakistan 5 4 10 
Philippines 5 6 17 
Turkey 5 11 93 
Viet Nam 5  33 
Ecuador 3 3 36 
Peru 3 6 19 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 2 2 30 
Bangladesh 1  1 
Cuba 1  18 
Dominican Republic 1 7 9 
Sri Lanka 1  4 
Moldova, Republic of 1 1 3 
Malaysia 1 1 22 
Nicaragua 1 2 17 
El Salvador 1  19 
Tunisia 1   
Afghanistan   2 
Armenia  2  
Benin   1 
Belize   4 
Bolivia, Plurinational State of   2 
Côte d’Ivoire   4 
Cameroon   1 
Dominica   3 
Egypt  4 32 
Fiji   3 
Ghana   1 
Grenada   1 
Guyana   3 
Jamaica   8 
Kazakhstan  1 35 
Kenya   3 
Kyrgyz Republic  1  
Saint Lucia   3 
Morocco  2  
Madagascar   4 
Mauritius   6 
Malawi   6 
Namibia   1 
Nigeria   6 
Paraguay   21 
Romania  2  
Senegal   2 
Suriname   1 
Eswatini   3 
Chad   1 
Tanzania   3 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   1 
Yemen   2 
South Africa  5 19 
Zambia   2 
Zimbabwe   6 
Total2 615 615 3077 
      1: European Union, Hong Kong and Taiwan are treated as separate countries for the purposes of analysis. 
2: Because there are often a number of countries listed as complainants and respondents, each dispute can   
appear more than once. The table is calculated by dividing disputes involving more than one complaints into 
as many as bilateral cases, so the total number is bigger than the number of dispute cases. 
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO, 2018a) 
  
Table A4: Contemporaneous correlations of explanatory variables 
 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂_𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 1          
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 0.27*** 1         
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 0.69*** 0.33*** 1        
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 0.30*** 0.69*** 0.41*** 1       
𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.59*** -0.04*** 0.23*** -0.04*** 1      
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑠𝑠 0.40*** -0.01*** 0.15*** -0.02*** 0.54*** 1     
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂_𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.22*** -0.07*** -0.02*** 1    
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 0.25*** 0.10*** 0.22*** 0.11*** 0.01* -0.00 0.01*** 1   
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.00 -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.04*** 1  
𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 0.51*** 0.20*** 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.04*** -0.09*** -0.37*** 1 
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